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Abstract-This paper offers an alternative proof of the so-called fundamental theorem of the 
theory of games or the minimax theorem. The proof uses a particularization of Farkas’ theorem 
involving the expression of one vector as a convex combination of a set of vectors. It is demonstrated 
that the minimax theorem holds as a consequence of this specialization of Farkas’ theorem of the 
alternative. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental or minimax theorem of two-person zero-sum games was first developed by von 
Neumann [l] in 1928 using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Since then this important result 
has received a considerable amount of attention, with a great deal of effort being devoted to 
alternative methods of proof (see, for instance: [2-121, among others). 
In what follows, we shall suggest yet another proof of the fundamental theorem which essentially 
“falls out” of a particular extension of Farkas’ theorem to a convex combination of points. Given 
the nature of the proof presented below, it may be broadly classified as one involving the use 
of a strong separation theorem for convex sets since Farkas’ theorem can be construed as a 
consequence of the same. 
2. THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF GAME THEORY 
Let B = [bij], i = 1,. . , m; j = 1,. . . , n, represent the payoff matrix for a two-person zero- 
sum game (here row i of B gives the expected payoffs to Player 1 if he uses strategy i, i = 1,. . . , m, 
while the columns of B reflect the strategies of Player 2). Furthermore, mixed strategies for 
Players 1, 2 are defined as u 2 0, 1’~ = 1 and u 1 0,l’v = 1 respectively, where pi (vj) is the 
probability of choosing pure strategy i(j). 
If Player 1 employs the mixed strategy u and Player 2 likewise uses 21, then the expected 
winnings for Player 1 are E(u, ZJ) = u’Bv. Player 1 desires to find a u which maximizes his 
minimum expected gain so that his expected winnings are at least 
ET = maxmjn E(u, u); 
u 
and Player 2 endeavors to hold Player l’s expected gain to no more than 
Ez = m;lnmzxE(U,w). 
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The solution to a two-person zero-sum game involves finding a set of optimal mixed strategies 
u*, U* which yield the optimal value of the game E* = E,* = EG. In this regard, the “fundamental 
(minimax) theorem for two-person zero-sum games” informs us that every matrix game has a 
solution in mixed strategies, i.e., there always exist u*, w* for which 
ET = mtxm;lnE(u,w) = E* = m;lnmUaE(u,v) = Ez, 
u* 2 0,1/u* = 1 and V* 2 0, l’~* = 1. (1) 
3. PROOF OF THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM 
To set the stage for a proof of the fundamental theorem of two-person zero-sum games let us 
first consider the following extension of Farkas’ theorem [13]: 
FARKAS' THEOREM UNDER CONVEX COMBINATION. For an (m x n) matrix A and a vector 
b&Z”, either 
(I) AX = b, X 1 0,l’X = 1 has a solution X E W or, 
(II) A’Y + ly 2 0, (b/Y, y) 5 0’ has a solution g E !R, Y E 3?m 
but never both. 
Next, if we again address the problem from the viewpoint of Player 1, we seek to determine a 
vector u which satisfies 
B’u 2 Eil, u 2 0, 1’~ = 1, (2) 
i.e., Player 1 will never expect to win more than the largest value of El for which there exists 
a u satisfying (2). Similarly, Player 2 seeks to find a vector v which will render the smallest E2 
satisfying 
Bv 2 Ezl, ZI 10, l’w = 1. (3) 
Based upon these considerations we may rewrite (2) as 
B’u-S = Erl, u 2 0,s 2 0, l’u = 1 or [B’, -In] [;] =Eil, [;I zO,[I’,O’] [;I =l. (2.1) 
Then according to the preceding theorem, either (2.1) has a solution [u’, S’] 2 0’ for u E RJZm, S E 
R” or, according to (II), there exists a y E 9, Y E W such that 
Clearly, (4) is equivalent to 
BY 2 -1y > 0, Y10, 1’Y so,y<o _ (4.1) 
(since we can assume that El > 0). Since (4.1) admits an obvious inconsistency (Figure l), it 
follows that (2.1) has a solution (call it U* 2 0). 
In this regard, 
Similarly, 
(~*)‘Bz, 2 Ez(u*)‘l = E2. 
so that 
v’B’u* 2 E;v’l = E; 
E2 2 (u*)‘Bv 2 ET. 
And since every matrix game has at most one value, there exists a u = v* such that E; = Ez 
and thus, the proof is complete. 
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Figure 1. 
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